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TIlE PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. COUNTY OF TULARE et al., 
Respondents. 
[1] Administrative Law-Court Review-Mandamus.-The Legis-
lature in Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, relating to mandamus, has 
provided an appropriate method of reviewing acts of a state-
wide administrative and quasi-judicial agency, such as the 
State Board of Equalization. 
[2] Taxation-Equalization-Proceedings-Review.-The action of 
the State Board of Equalization in ordering an increase in the 
assessment of all taxable property within a county affected 
by its order is reviewable in the superior court pursuant to 
the provisions of Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, relating to man-
damus. 
[3] Id.-Equalization-Proceedings-Review.-Where the superior 
. court, having jurisdiction, had assumed jurisdiction of a pro-
ceeding under Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, to review the action 
of the State Board of Equalization in increasing the assess-
ment of all taxable property within a county affected by the 
board's order, no valid reason appeared why the Supreme 
Court should take original jurisdiction in the matter. 
[4] Mandamus-Defenses-Pendency of Another Action.-Where 
there is pending another mandamus proceeding in the superior 
court seeking the same result, involving the same parties and 
the same issues, the Supreme Court will generally not assume 
jurisdiction. 
[6] Abatement - Pendency of Another Action.-When another 
court with concurrent jurisdiction has assumed the same in 
an action seeking the same relief between the same parties, 
the Supreme Court ordinarily will not assume jurisdiction. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to direct Tulare County and 
certain county officers to increase the assessed valuation of 
all taxable property on the local rolls of such county in com-
pliance with an order of the State Board of Equalization. 
Alternative writ discharged and petition denied. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, §§ 196, 204 et seq.; Am. 
Jur., Public Administrative Law, § 186 et seq. 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Taxation, § 230; Am.Jur., Taxation, § 767'et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Administrative Law, §19; [2,3] 
Taxation, § 208; [4] Mandamus, § 75; [5] Abatement, § 1L 
l .... .. 
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Edmund G. Browll, Attorney General, E. G. Benard, James 
E. Sabine and Irving H. Perluss, Assistant Attorneys Gen-
eral, and Edward P. Hollingshead, Deputy Attorney General, 
for Petitioner. 
01 
Ralph B. Jordan, County Counsel, Calvin E. Baldwin, As-
sistant County Counsel, Holbrook, Tarr, Carter & O'NeilJ, 
W. Sumner Holbrook, Jr., Francis H. O'Neill and Leroy 
McCormick for Respondents. 
Hutchinson & Quattrin as Amici Curiae on behalf of Re-
spondents. 
McCOMB, J. pro tern. ·-Petitioner is seeking the issuance 
of a writ of mandate to respondents directing them to in-
crease the assessed valuation of all taxable property on the 
local rolls of Tulare County in compliance with an order of 
the State Board of Equalization dated August 15, 1955. 
The order in question was issued by the State Board of 
Equalization upon findings made by said board following 
a hearing held by it on July 25, 1955, entitled "In the Matter 
of the Equalization of the Local Roll of Tulare County for 
the Fiscal Year 1955-1956" and conducted pursuant to the 
provisions of article XIII, section 9, Constitution of the State 
of California and sections 1831-1834 of the Revenue and 
Taxation Code. 
The board found that the" average ratio of assessed value 
to market value of the taxable property within the County 
of 'rulare is such that the addition of twenty-three (23) per 
centum to the valuation of said county is required to equalize 
the assessment of the property contained in said local assess-
ment roll with the assessment of property in the several 
counties of the State" and ordered that "the assessed value 
of all taxable property in the local assessment roll for the 
fiscal year 1955-56 of the County of Tulare, except such 
property as is not subject to the laws generally applicable 
to the assessment and equalization of property by reason of 
specific constitutional provisions relating thereto, be increased 
by twenty-three (23) per centum." 
Also on August 15, 1955, the State Board of Equalization 
notified the county auditor and the Board of Supervisors 
of the County of Tulare, and the city council of each city 
• Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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in that county, of its order and directed the county auditor 
to increase the assessment of all property affected by its 
order by making the corresponding changes in the assessment 
roll. 
On August 30, 1955, a proceeding was commenced in the 
Superior Court of Tulare County by the County of Tulare, 
as plaintiff, against the State Board of Equalization, the 
members thereof, and the county auditor of said county. In 
said action the county of Tulare challenges the regularity 
of the proceedings before the State Board of Equalization, 
the findings of the board and the validity of its order. On 
the same date an alternative writ of mandate was issued in 
that action by the superior court, directing the board and 
its members to set aside their order of August 15, 1955, or 
show cause as to why they had not done so, directing the 
county auditor to omit from the county ass('ssment roll the 
23 per cent increase as ordered by said board, commanding the 
board to show cause why its proceedings, insofar as they 
related to the county of Tulare, should not be reviewed ac-
cording to the provisions of section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, and ordering that pending the determination of 
said action the order of the board be stayed. 
On September 1, 1955, the Board of Supervisors of Tulare 
County fixed the 1955 tax rate for said county, pursuant 
to section 2151 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, computing 
such rates without the 23 per cent increase ordered by the 
State Board of Equalization. Similarly, on August 31, 1955, 
the City Council of the City of Woodlake in Tulare County, 
which city collects its taxes on the county roll under the 
consolidated system of taxation, fixed its tax rate without 
including in its computation the 23 per cent increase ordered 
by the board. Each of these levies was made on the last day 
on which these entities could levy tax rates for 1955, and was 
in compliance with the mandate of the superior court . 
. This court issued an alternative writ of mandate returnable 
September 30. 1955. 
[1] The Legislature, in section 1094.5 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure, has provided an appropriate method of 
reviewing acts of a statewide administrative and quasi-judicial 
agency such as the State Board of Equalization. (Temescal 
Water Co. v. Department of Public lVorks, 44 Ca1.2d 90, 105 
[9] [280 P .2d 1 J .) [2] The action of the State Board of 
Equalization is reviewable in the superior court pursuant 
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to the provisions of section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure. (TemescallVater Co. v. Department of Public Works, 
supra; Eastern-Columbia, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 61 
Cal.App.2d 734, 745 [143 P.2d 992].) 
i\lso rule 56(a) (1), Rules on Original Proceedings in Re-
viewing Court, 36 Ca1.2d 41, provides: "If the petition might 
lawfully have been made to a lower court in the first instance, 
it shall set forth the circumstances which, in the opinion 
of the petitioner, render it proper that the writ should issue 
originally from the reviewing court." [3] In the instant 
case. application has in fact been made by respondent to the 
superior court having jurisdiction and that court having 
assumed jurisdiction, no valid reason appears why this court 
should take original jurisdiction in the matter. (Cf. Roma 
Macaroni Factory v. G1'ambasi1'ani, 219 Cal. 435, 436 [1] [27 
P.2d 371J ; Brougher v. Board of Public Works, 205 Cal. 426, 
440 [6] [271 P. 487].) 
[4] Where, as in the instant case, it appears that there 
is pending another action in the superior court seeking the 
same result, involving the same parties and the same issues, 
this court will generally not assume jurisdiction. (Irvine v. 
Gibson, 19 Cal.2d 14, 16 [3] [118 P.2d 812].) [5] When 
another court with concurrent jurisdiction has assumed the 
same in an action seeking the same relief between the same 
parties, this court ordinarily will not assume jurisdiction. 
(W. R. Grace &- Co. v. California Emp. Com., 24 Ca1.2d 720, 
727 [2] [151 P.2d 215] ; McMullen v. Glenn-Col'usa Irr. Dist., 
17 Cal.App.2d 696, 701 [6] [62 P.2d 1083].) 
The exceptional facts presented in Perry v. Jordan, 34 Cal. 
2d 87 [207 P.2d 47], are not here present. The cited case 
involved a statewide election, callable at the governor's dis-
cretion, for a special or general election, under conditions 
as to whieh he could not act while litigation was pending, 
and in such case the parties were not the same. Therefore, 
a plea in abatement would not lie. Such is not the situation 
in this case. In the present ease none of the special factors 
warranting the original writ in the Perry case exist. The 
dispute involved is solely between the State Board of Equali-
zation and the county of Tulare. No qnestion is involved 
as to the other 13 counties which have been the subject of 
similar proceedings before the state board because (a) the 
hearings were conducted separately and (b) the order in 
question was limited solely to the single county. 
) 
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For the foregoing reasons the a1tf'rnative writ heretofore 
issued is discharged and the petition denied. 
Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
TRA YNOR, J.-I dissent. 
I would issue the peremptory writ forthwith for the fol-
lowing reasons: 
(1) The State Board of Equalization not only had juris-
diction but had the duty under the California Constitution 
tv equalize the valuation of taxable property in the several 
counties (Canst., art. XIII, § 9; Rev. & Tax. Code, § 1831; 
People v. Dunn, 59 Cal. 328, 330-331; Baldwin v. Ell1:S, 68 
Cal. 495, 499-500 [9 P. 652]) despite the suspension of 
chapter 1466, Statutes of 1949. (Stats. 1951, ch. 1554; Stats. 
1953, ch. 362; Stats. 1955, ch. 256; see 18 Ops. Cal. Atty. 
Gen. 66.) 
(2) There is a compelling necessity for such equalization: 
(a) State assessed property (largely public utility property) 
and locally assessed property are taxed at the same rate. 
(Const., art. XIII, § 14.) To prevent discrimination against 
either class of property in violation of article XIII, section 1 
of the Constitution, both must. be assessed at the same level. 
Since it is implicit in the board's order that it assesses utility 
property in Tulare County at a higher level than the county 
assessor assesses property in the county, a prima facie case 
of discrimination against utility property exists if the assess-
ments are not equalized. (b) The amount of school equali-
zation aid (see Ed. Code, §§ 7031-7038; Report of the Senate 
Committee on State and Local Taxation, part Six, March 
1953, pp. 15-17) distributed by the state to school districts 
depends in part on the assessed value of property in the 
district. In the current fiscal year more than $84,000,000 
will be distributed by the state to school districts. To prevent 
discrimination among school districts in the distribution of 
this aid, intercounty assessments must be at the same level. 
(c) Equitable assignment of priorities in the advancement of 
state funds for school construction and uniformity as to 
repayment of such' advances (Ed. Code, §§ 5044.5, 5053 et seq., 
7705, 7725 et seq.), uniform application of tax rate and bonded 
indebtedness limitations (e.g. Ed. Code, §§ 6357, 74'31), 
equitable distribution of taxes of districts embracing areas 
in more than one county (e.g. Ed. Code, § 6381; Health & 
.s C.2d-ll 
) 
332 PEOPLE V. COUNTY OF TULARE [45 C.2d 
Safe Code, §§ 14600-14760), and uniform application of house-
holders' and veterans' exemptions (Const., art. XIII, §§ 1%, 
101/ 2 ) and real property ownership qualifications of recipients 
of welfare aid (Welf. & Jnst. Code, §§ 1520, 2164, 3047), 
reguire intercounty assessments at the same level. r.J.'hus, if 
the board's order in this case is valid and is not enforced, 
Tulare County will enjoy a discriminatory advantage with 
respect to the matters described under (b) and (c) over the 
13 other counties that have complied with the board's orders 
to increase their assessment rolls. (d) Should a state ad 
valorem tax be levied (see Const., art. IV, § 34(a); Rev. & 
'l'ax. Code, §§ 28001-28011), intercounty equalization is essen-
tial to insure the same level of assessment throughout the 
state. 
(3) Following equalization by the State Board of Equali-
zation the county officials had no discretion to exercise with 
respect to the board's order but were under a ministerial 
duty to obey it. (People's ·Water 00. v. Boromeo, 31 Cal. 
App. 270, 272-273 [160 P. 574].) Mandamus is the tradi-
tional remedy to enforce that duty. (People V. Dunn, 59 
Cal. 328; Morton v. Broderick, 118 Cal. 474, 480-481 [50 
P. 644].) 
(4) Since the time schedule established by statute for the 
delivery of the roll, fixing the tax rate, and the execution 
of affidavits is directory and not jurisdictional (Rev. & Tax. 
Code, § 24;· Universal Oonsol. Oil 00. V. Byram, 25 Ca1.2d 353, 
362-363 [153 P.2d 746] ; Ryan v. Byram, 4 Ca1.2d 596, 603-607 
[51 P.2d 872] ; Whiting Finance 00. v. Hopkins, 199 Cal. 428, 
436 [249 P. 853] ; Buswell V. Supervisors of Alameda Oounty, 
116 Cal. 351, 353-354 [48 P .2d 226] ; see Steele V. San Luis 
OMspo, 152 Cal. 785, 786-788 [93 P. 1020]), an order of this 
court to the county officials to do now what they should have 
done will not invalidate the tax levy. Refusal of county 
officials to perform their ministerial duties within the time 
prescribed cannot frustrate the equalization demande::l by the 
Constitution or render this court impotent to enforce it. 
*"N 0 act in all the proceedings for raising revenue by taxation is 
illegal on account of informality or because not completed within the 
rcquired timc." 
In San Diego etc. By. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 164 Cal. 
41, 43 [127 P. 153), relied on by rcspondents, the assessment roll 
had becn delivcrcd "in acconlancc with law." In the present case the 
assessment roll has not been delivcred in accordance with law. The 
auditor did not enter the changes ordered by th~ board, nor did he 
l'ertify that he had "corrected it as required by the State Board of 
Equalization." (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 2601.) 
) 
) 
Oct. 1955] PEOPLE V. COUNTY,OF TULARE 
[45 C.2d 317: 289 P.2d 111 
323 
Moreover, the contention that it would be an idle act for 
this court to issue a writ in this case applies with greater 
force to an order of the supel"ior court under section 1094.5 
of the Code of Civil Procedure in view of the delay neces-
sarily involved in getting a final determination of tllis court 
following an appeal from such an order. If section 1094.5 
affords the appropriate remedy in cases of this kind, and if 
court orders would be futile if not made within the statutory 
time schedule for completing the taxing process, county offi-
cials need only to proceed under that section in the superior 
court to prevent the constitutional provisions for equalization 
from ever being carried out, for a final determination could 
not be reached in such proceeding within the time schedule.· 
(5) The fact that proceeding No. 47478 is now pending 
in the Superior Court in Tulare County does not bar the 
present proceeding. Compelling reasons for an immediate 
final determination by this court are present here as they 
were in Perry v. Jordan, 34 Ca1.2d 87, 90-91 [207 P.2d 47], 
in which a prior proceeding in mandamus was also pending 
in the superior court. Although completion of the taxing 
process within the statutory time schedule is not jurisdic-
tional, it is of vital public importance that it be completed 
as soon as possible to avoid complete disruption of the taxing 
process. 
The entire record is now before this court, aud only con-
fusion can result from the refusal to make a final determina-
tion now as to the validity of the board's order, the identical 
question that would ha.ve to be determined by this court 
*The equalization of the local roll by the Board of Supervisors 
is not completed until the third Monday in July (Rev. & Tax. Code, 
~ 1603) and no action can be taken by tIle State Board of Equaliza-
tion on that roll until after that time. (Koch v. Board of Supervisors, 
138 Cal.App. 343, 348 [32 P.2d 163].) The State Board of Equaliza-
tion sits from the third Monday in July to and including the third 
Monday in August, and it is during that time that it is required to 
equalize the valuation of the taxable property in the several counties 
of the State. (Rev. & Tax. Code, ~ 1831 j Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 18, 
rule 2700.) On or before September 1st of each year the County 
Board of Supervisors fixes the rates of county and district taxes. 
(Gov. Code, ~ 29120.) The auditor must deliver the secured roll 
"corrected .•• as required by the State Board of Equalization" on 
or before October 1st. (Rev. & Tax. Code, ~ 2601.) One half the 
real property taxes on the secured roll and all of the personal prop-
erty taxes are due November 1st (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 2605) and, if 
unpaid, are delinquent December 10th. (Rev. & 'rax. Code, § 2617.) 
The second half of the real property taxes is due January 20th (Rev. 
&, Tax. Code. § 2606) and, if unpaid, is delinquent April 10th. (Rev. 
& Tax. Code, ~ 2618.) 
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following an appeal from an order of the superior court.. 
Since the jurisdiction of the State Board of Equalization 
to equalize the valuation of property in the several counties 
is derived directly from the Constitution (COl1st., art. XIII, 
§ 9J, the court does not exercise an independent judgment 
on the evidence, and the board's determinations of fact are 
therefore not subject to reexamination in a trial de novo in 
the superior court. Only questions of law are presented, 
namely: Did the board proceed without or in excess of its 
jurisdiction f Did it commit any prejudicial errors of law 
or abuse of discretion f Is its order supported by substantial 
evidence f (Covert v. State Board of Equalization, 29 Ca1.2d 
125, 131-132 [173 P.2d 545].) 
(6) The record discloses that the county of Tulare, after 
full opportunity afforded by the board to show cause why 
the valuations on the local roll of the county should not be 
increased, not only failed to show that the action of the board 
was arbitrary or capricious, but failed to carry its burden 
of proof or even produce any substantial evidence of the 
ratio of the assessed value on the local roll to market value 
(see Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 18, rule 2704; Howard County 
v. State Board of Equalization, 158 Neb. 339 [63 N.W.2d 
441, 448]), that the State Board of Equalization did not 
act without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or commit errors 
of law or abuse its discretion, and that there is ample evidence 
to support its order. (Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co. v. County 
of Los A.ngeles, 162 Cal. 164, 167-170 [121 P. 384, 9 A.L.R. 
1277] ; Miller & Lux v. Richardson, 182 Cal. 115, 128 [187 
P. 411] ; Utah Const. Co. v. Richardson, 187 Cal. 649, 654-655 
[203 P. 401] ; Eastern Columbia, Inc. v. COlmty of Los An-
geles, 61 Cal.App.2d 734, 745-746 [143 P.2d 992].) 
Gibson, C. J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied No-
vember 23, 1955. Gibson, C. ~r., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., 
were of the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
